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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 In 2000, my colleague Yousuf Vawda1 and I became active in the global campaign 
to address intellectual property rights (IPRs), human rights, and barriers to access to 
affordable medicines for treating HIV and AIDS in South Africa. Anonymous HIV 
testing at the University of Durban-Westville (UDW) had revealed a staggering rate 
of untreated infection. In response, from 2001 to 2002, we sketched outlines of 
reforms to South Africa’s patent regime in order to take advantage of the public 
health f lexibilities allowed under governing international norms.
 From 2001 to 2007, Yousuf and I engaged in intellectual property (IP) and 
access-to-medicines work, publishing academically and advocating in support of 
treatment campaigns being waged in South Africa and elsewhere.2 In 2008, we 
received support for an intensive course on IP and access to medicines offered to 
grassroots activists, academics, health practitioners, and interested government 
officials. Although we introduced participants to rigorous analysis of IPRs, the right 
to health, pharmaceutical economics, procurement and supply systems, and more, 
the course, funded by the Open Society Institute (OSI),3 was also designed to expose 
1. Yousuf Vawda is an Associate Professor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Law. Professor 
Yousuf Vawda, U. KwaZulu-Natal, http://law.ukzn.ac.za/School-Staff/Academicstaff/law-staff.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
2. See, e.g., Brook K. Baker, Processes and Issues for Improving Access to Medicines: Willingness 
and Ability to Utilise TRIPS Flexibilities in Non-Producing Countries 7 (DFID Health 
Systems Resource Centre, 2004) [hereinafter Baker, Processes and Issues for Improving Access 
to Medicines]; Brook K. Baker, ACTA—Risks of Third-Party Enforcement for Access to Medicines, 26 
Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 579 (2011); Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis 
of WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
14 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 613 (2004) [hereinafter Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing 
Medicines]; Brook K. Baker, Debunking IP-for-Development: Africa Needs IP Space, Not IP Shackles, in 
International Economic Law and African Development 82 (Laurence Boulle et al. eds., 2014) 
[hereinafter Baker, Debunking IP-for-Development]; Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration 
Apartheid—Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 Am. J.L. & Med. 303 (2008); 
Sean Flynn, Brook K. Baker, Margot Kaminski & Jimmy Koo, The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual 
Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 105 (2012) 
[hereinafter Flynn et al.]; Y.A. Vawda, Free Trade Agreements with the US—Are They Good for Your 
Health?, 32 J. Juridical Sci. 116 (2007); Yousuf Vawda, From Doha to Cancun: The Quest to Increase 
Access to Medicines Under WTO Rules, 19 SAJHR 679 (2003); Yousuf A. Vawda, Tripped-up on TRIPS: 
The Story of Shrinking Access to Drugs in Developing Countries, 13 Stellenbosch L. Rev. 352 (2002); 
Yousuf A. Vawda & Brook K. Baker, Achieving Social Justice in the Human Rights/Intellectual Property 
Debate: Realising the Goal of Access to Medicines, 13 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 55 (2013) [hereinafter Vawda & 
Baker, Achieving Social Justice in the Human Rights/Intellectual Property Debate]; Tenu Avafia & Brook K. 
Baker, Laws and Practices that Facilitate or Impede HIV-Related Treatment Access (Global Comm’n on 
HIV and the Law, Working Paper No. GCHL/MTG1/WP/13, 2010); Brook K. Baker & Tenu Avafia, 
The Evolution of IPRs from Humble Beginnings to the Modern Day TRIPS-Plus Era: Implications for 
Treatment Access (July 7–9, 2011) [hereinafter Baker & Avafia, The Evolution of IPRs] (unpublished 
working paper), www.hivlawcommission.org/index.php/working-papers/the-evolution-of-IPRs-from-
Humble-Beginnings-to-the-Modern-Day-TRIPS-plus-Era-Implications-for-Treatment-Access.pdf.
3. This organization is now known as the “Open Society Foundations” (OSF). See About Us: History, Open 
Soc’y Found., https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/history (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
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participants to global access-to-medicines campaigns fought in South Africa and 
elsewhere and to help participants plan campaigns that might be waged in their own 
countries or regions.4 We taught the two-week intensive course for five years and in 
the fourth year recruited strong participants from the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC)5 and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).6 Yousuf had been conducting Ph.D. 
research on f laws in the South African patent regime, especially the failure to 
examine patent applications, which revealed excessive patenting for medicines that 
delayed access to more affordable generic equivalents. In the last week of the 2011 
course, TAC, MSF, and other sub-Saharan African participants drafted a 
comprehensive campaign strategy to launch the Fix the Patent Laws Campaign (the 
“Campaign”) in South Africa.
 With the support of OSI/OSF and other funders, the Campaign was launched as 
planned in late 2011. In addition to creating popular education materials, organizing 
demonstrations, and orchestrating a press strategy, the Campaign also engaged in a 
heady insider strategy within the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which 
houses the South African Patent Office, and the Department of Health. Through a 
series of public events and private consultations, key officials were made aware of the 
heavy toll South Africa was paying because of its retrograde patent regime. The 
Campaign also drew contrasts between the pro-IP flexibilities that South Africa was 
espousing on the international stage and its weak legislation at home. While the 
Campaign has not yet fully won the reforms it seeks, the South African government 
released a draft National Policy on Intellectual Property (the “Draft IP Policy”) in 
September 2013 outlining intended reforms along the lines of what the Campaign 
had proposed.
 This paper details our academic collaboration, our activist-oriented “clinical” 
offering, and the vibrant campaign that it helped to spawn. It also situates the 
Campaign within the global framework of pro-Pharma legal rules and diplomatic 
pressures, showing the connections between the global political economy and local 
reform efforts grounded in the right to health enshrined in the South African 
4. Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines, U. KwaZulu-Natal, http://ipatm.ukzn.ac.za/Homepage.
aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
5. TAC was started in 1998 to advocate for South Africa to begin a more vigorous response to the HIV 
and AIDS pandemic, particularly by providing access to anti-retroviral therapy. For a history of its early 
years, see Treatment Action Campaign, Fighting for our Lives: The History of the 
Treatment Action Campaign 1998-2010, at 3 (2010), http://www.tac.org.za/files/10yearbook/
index.html.
6. MSF is a well-known medical relief organization that received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999. That 
same year it started its Access Campaign “to push for access to, and the development of life-saving and 
life prolonging medicines, diagnostic tests and vaccines for patients in MSF programmes and beyond.” 
About Us, Médecins Sans Frontières Access Campaign, http://www.msfaccess.org/the-access-
campaign (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). MSF and TAC participants who attended in 2011 and strategized 
the Fix the Patent Laws Campaign included Catherine Tomlinson, Mara Kardis-Nelson, Marcus Low, 
and Lynette Mabote.
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Constitution. In Part II, I discuss the beginning of my involvement in IP and access-
to-medicines work. Part III describes law reform efforts that address upstream 
barriers to the right to health and the collaboration between academics, practitioners, 
funders, and social movements that help energize needed reforms. Part IV explains 
the creation of IP systems that block access to generic medicines. Part V outlines the 
IP flexibilities permitted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Part VI discusses 
the deficiencies of the South African Patents Act of 1978. Part VII focuses on my 
involvement in developing a two-week IP course at the University of KwaZulu-Natal 
(UKZN). Part VIII details the creation of the Fix the Patent Laws Campaign. Part 
IX concludes the paper.
ii. birth Of MY CaMpaign tO fiX patEnt LaW LEgisLatiOn
 At the Thirteenth International AIDS Conference, held on July 9 through July 
13, 2000 in Durban, South Africa,7 I cheered with excitement at the satellite 
conference organized by MSF and TAC at Durban City Hall. Yousuf, who directed 
the law clinic at UDW, was there along with his wife Cati Vawda, who was on 
TAC’s National Executive Council leading the children’s sector response to HIV. I 
had heard reports about the staggering prevalence of HIV in South Africa during my 
previous visits to Durban. By the time of the conference, I had heard about 
anonymous testing at UDW, which showed that nearly twenty-five per cent of 
students tested positive for HIV, 8 with much higher rates among black Africans than 
Indian or white students. Prior to the conference, I had worked for three years 
developing an HIV-related curriculum and worked with Yousuf in UDW’s clinic, 
where we routinely confronted cases of clients affected by HIV,9 but that response 
felt and was inadequate.
 The satellite conference was electrifying, as speakers spoke about the high cost of 
medicines, an MSF anti-retroviral (ARV) treatment program being piloted in 
Kyayelitsha, and a campaign against Pfizer, a major U.S. pharmaceutical company, 
to lower the costs of f luconazole, an antifungal medication used to treat cryptococcal 
meningitis and systemic thrush. For the first time in my life, I heard the words 
7. For a brief, activist account of the Durban conference, see Nathan Geffen, What Happened in Durban? A 
South African Perspective, Body, http://www.thebody.com/content/art13213.html (last visited Apr. 9, 
2016).
8. See Linda Vergnani, AIDS Virus is Widespread on South African Campus, Chron. Higher Educ. (June 
11, 1999), http://chronicle.com/article/AIDS-Virus-Is-Widespread-on/18092/ (noting that the majority 
of students testing positive for HIV were women).
9. For a description of some of those cases, see Brook K. Baker, Teaching Legal Skills in South Africa: A 
Transformation from Cross-Cultural Collaboration to International HIV/AIDS Solidarity, 9 J. Legal 
Writing 145 (2003).
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“parallel importation”10 and “compulsory licenses.”11 They were uttered not by law 
professors, but by activists on the stage describing the campaigns needed to supply 
affordable medicines to millions of people living with HIV in South Africa. In 
particular, I heard that TAC had launched a campaign against President Thabo 
Mbeki’s AIDS denialist policies, demanding that ARVs be used to prevent mother-
to-child transmission of HIV.12 Speakers denounced the high cost of f luconazole,13 
which was selling for ZAR5014 per pill in the private sector and ZAR29 per pill in 
the public sector but was available generically in Thailand for less than ZAR2 
(approximately $0.28).15 I heard that thirty-nine pharmaceutical companies and trade 
associations had filed suit against the South African Amended Medicines and 
Related Substances Control Act that was designed to lower drug prices by allowing 
parallel importation of branded medicines sold more cheaply elsewhere, generic 
substitution by pharmacists, and price transparency and control.16
 Perhaps most movingly, we heard Constitutional Court Justice Edwin Cameron’s 
famous and brave speech:
I can tell you that you taste death in your mouth when you have AIDS. . . .
 . . . .
 I fell ill 33 months ago. So I should be dead by now. Instead of which, I’m 
here, “ngikhona”, “ngiyaphila”, I’m still living.
10. Parallel importation is the legal importation of a medicine that is otherwise patent protected in the 
importing country from another country where the patent owner has previously marketed the medicine 
or allowed it to be marketed. An alternative understanding of parallel importation argues that it is 
permissible whenever the product has been lawfully marketed elsewhere, with or without the patent 
holder’s assent. Where an importing country has adopted the international exhaustion rule, the first sale 
of the product anywhere in the world “exhausts” the patent holder’s rights, meaning the patent holder 
cannot block the export or import of the medicines. Countries pursue parallel importation when 
patented medicines are available more cheaply abroad. See generally Chang-Fa Lo, Potential Conflict 
Between TRIPS and GATT Concerning Parallel Importation of Drugs and Possible Solution to Prevent 
Undesirable Market Segmentation, 66 Food Drug L.J. 73, 73–74 (2011) (discussing parallel importation). 
11. Compulsory licenses are rights granted by governments that allow non-patent holders to work a patent, 
thereby creating some degree of competition with the patent holder. A compulsory license may be 
granted on any public interest grounds, but international trade law requires that certain formalities be 
followed and that adequate remuneration, usually in the form of royalties, be paid. See generally Laura 
Bloodgood, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, ICT Pub. No. 3931, Competitive Conditions for 
Foreign Direct Investment in India, at 5–6 n.42 (2007) (“A compulsory license is one issued by the 
government that allows the use of a patented invention without consent of the owner, upon payment of 
a royalty.”).
12. Treatment Action Campaign, supra note 5, at 19–25.
13. Fluconazole is used to treat cryptococcal meningitis and systemic thrush. Christopher Moraka Defiance 
Campaign Against Patent Abuse and AIDS Profiteering by Drug Companies, Treatment Action 
Campaign, http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/DefianceCampaign/defiancecampaign.htm (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2016) [hereinafter Christopher Moraka Defiance Campaign].
14. ZAR refers to Rand, South Africa’s currency.
15. Christopher Moraka Defiance Campaign, supra note 13.
16. See Pharm. Mfrs.’ Ass’n of S. Afr. 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at paras. 1, 60–61.
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 . . . .
 There are people throughout Africa, 24 or 25 million people in Africa 
and nearly 34 million people in our whole world who are this moment dying. 
And they [are] dying because they don’t have the privilege that I have, of 
purchasing my health and life.17
We also heard from Dr. Peter Mugyenyi, an AIDS clinician from Uganda who, 
pointing out the disparities in global access to highly active anti-retroviral therapy 
(HAART), said: “Drugs are where the disease is not . . . . The disease is where the 
drugs are not.”18
 After the satellite conference, thousands of people gathered on the steps of 
Durban City Hall. Thousands strong, in the first international march for global 
AIDS treatment, protestors danced, sang, and chanted to the site of the opening 
ceremonies of the International AIDS Conference to deliver demands to the 
organizers.19 Once inside, we listened to President Mbeki question whether a single 
virus could cause South Africa’s health woes and defend his convening of an HIV/
AIDS panel in which credible AIDS scientists and discredited AIDS dissidents 
were equally represented.20 Shortly thereafter, he walked off the stage, shunning the 
presence of Nkosi Johnson, an eleven-year-old South African with AIDS who urged 
the government to take action to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV and 
implored everyone “Care for us and accept us- we are all human beings.”21
 That day and evening, July 9, 2000, changed my life. Our son, Chad, who had 
been diagnosed with pediatric cancer in June 1986, had avoided the risk of HIV 
transmission from blood transfusions by a matter of months. Elsewhere, parents just 
like me were watching their children die untreated. Like thousands in Durban, I 
knew that ARVs were not available in South Africa because patent-holding drug 
companies located in Europe and the United States were charging the same prices 
for ARVs in Africa that they were charging in the United States: approximately 
$10,439 per year.22 Some drug companies had announced a discount price initiative 
17. Edwin Cameron, Judge, Constitutional Court of S. Afr., Closing Remarks at the Thirteenth International 
AIDS Conference (July 14, 2000), http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/Speeches/ec9july.txt.
18. See Sabin Russell, Mbeki’s HIV Stand Angers Delegates/Hundreds Walk Out on his Speech, S.F. Chron. 
(July 10, 2000) (quoting Peter Mugyenyi), http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Mbeki-s-HIV-Stand-
Angers-Delegates-Hundreds-2749508.php. 
19. See Richard Pithouse, Report on Global March for Treatment Access, Treatment Action Campaign, 
http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/Other/march.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
20. See Russell, supra note 18; see also Thabo Mbeki, President of S. Afr., Speech at the Opening Ceremony 
of the Thirteenth International AIDS Conference (July 9, 2000), http://www.actupny.org/reports/
durban-mbeki.html.
21. See Nkosi Johnson, Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Thirteenth International AIDS Conference 
(July 9, 2000), http://www.ieterna.org/archive-pdf/people/autobiography/Nkosi%20speech.pdf.
22. See Médecins Sans Frontières, Untangling the Web of Antiretroviral Price Reductions 10 
(15th ed. 2012), http://www.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF_assets/HIV_AIDS/Docs/AIDS_
report_UTW15_ENG_2012.pdf.
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in May of that year, but negotiations were being conducted on a secretive drug-by-
drug, country-by-country basis.23
 I returned to the United States energized and motivated. I dedicated myself to 
learning more about the international IP regime and how to make national laws 
more conducive to manufacturing and importing cheaper generic equivalents of 
grossly overpriced medicines. While exploring global AIDS activism in the United 
States, I started working with Health Global Access Project (“Health GAP”), which 
had helped organize protests in Durban and had also been fighting U.S. trade 
pressure against South Africa24 and the lawsuit by thirty-nine pharmaceutical 
companies and trade associations against President Nelson Mandela.25
iii.  sOUth afriCan aCtiVists and aLLiEs fight pharMaCEUtiCaL aparthEid 
in sOUth afriCa
 The HIV/AIDS pandemic peaked globally in 1997 with approximately 3.6 
million recorded infections, and in South Africa from 1998 to 19 99 with an estimated 
650,000 new infections.26 AIDS policy in South Africa was constipated at best long 
before Thabo Mbeki’s presidency. The apartheid government was indifferent to a 
disease thought to target gay men and poor black Africans. The apartheid health 
system was appallingly unequal; over 80% of the population were not members of a 
medical scheme and only 23% of the population used private sector services regularly, 
yet nearly 60% of total health financing went to the privileged, primarily white 
23. See World Health Org. [WHO] & Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS [UNAIDS], 
Accelerating Access Initiative: Widening Access to Care and Support for People Living with 
HIV/AIDS—Progress Report (2002), http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/prev_care/isbn9241210125.pdf.
24. With respect to U.S. trade pressure, see Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1999) (denying assistance to South Africa 
until the repeal, suspension, or termination of section 15C). According to U.S. State Department 
documents and statements, “[multiple federal agencies] have been engaged in an assiduous, concerted 
campaign to persuade the Government of South Africa (SAG) to withdraw or modify the provisions of 
Article 15(C) . . . .” Patricia D. Siplon, AIDS and the Policy Struggle in the United States 
120−21 (2002) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Government Efforts to Negotiate the Repeal, 
Termination or Withdrawal of Article 15(C) of the South African Medicines and Related Substances 
Act of 1965 (1999)); see also Patrick Bond, Globalization, Pharmaceutical Pricing, and South African Health 
Policy: Managing Confrontation with U.S. Firms and Politicians, 29 Int’l J. Health Serv. 765 (1999). 
For a description of some of Health GAP’s activism against U.S. trade pressure, see Candidate GORE 
Zaps, ACT UP, http://actupny.org/actions/gorezaps.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
25. See Pharm. Mfrs.’ Ass’n of S. Afr. 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC); see also Pat Sidley, Drug Companies Sue South 
African Government over Generics, 322 Brit. Med. J. 447, 447 (2001). 
26. For global statistics, see Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS [UNAIDS], How AIDS 
Changed Everything: HIV Estimates with Uncertainty Bounds 1990-2014 (2015), http://
www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/MDG6Report_en.pdf. But see Christopher Murray et 
al., Global, Regional, and National Incidence and Mortality for HIV, Tuberculosis, and Malaria During 
1990–2013: A Systematic Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013, 384 Lancet 1005, 1030–31 
(2014) (questioning UNAIDS’s global HIV prevalence statistics).
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private health sector.27 Although the new African National Congress (ANC) 
government developed preliminary AIDS strategies,28 its major preoccupations were 
inward: its new governance role, its economic policy, and the persisting legacies of 
apartheid. President Mandela was initially tongue-tied about HIV, not mentioning it 
until late in his presidency.29 His successor, President Mbeki, fell under the sway of 
AIDS dissidents. Suspicious of the agenda of multinational drug companies and the 
governments that supported them, inattentive to the vast weight of scientific 
evidence, and angry over the prevailing portrayals of dangerous, hyper-sexualized 
African men, Mbeki retreated further from positive engagement of the HIV crisis, 
dragging his Minster of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, with him into the 
vortex of HIV denialism.30
 The legacies of apartheid, including a tattered and inequitable public health 
system; the squeamishness, frugality, and denialism of ANC policy; and the myriad 
domestic drivers of HIV—a migrant labor force, sexual patriarchy, and disrupted 
families—combined with global determinants including intellectual property 
hegemony, export-oriented trade, and structural adjustment.31 These conf luences 
produced the perfect storm for South Africa’s viral holocaust.
 Through its most public anti-HIV effort, the farcical HIV prevention debacle 
Sarafina II,32 and the false AIDS cure Virodene P058,33 the ANC revealed itself to 
be bungling at best. In the midst of this policy miasma, TAC was founded in 1998 to 
fight for prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) and a more robust 
27. These figures come from an early post-apartheid study, Health Sys. Tr. & World Bank, Health 
Expenditure and Finance in South Africa 1, 14 (1995), http://www.hst.org.za/sites/default/files/
hstefsa.pdf.
28. See A National Health Plan for South Africa, Afr. Nat’l Congress (May 30, 1994), http://www.anc.org.
za/show.php?id=257; see also Anthony Butler, South Africa’s HIV/AIDS Policy, 1994–2004: How Can It Be 
Explained?, 104 Afr. Aff. 591, 592–93 (2005); Mark Heywood & Morna Cornell, Human Rights and 
AIDS in South Africa: From Right Margin to Left Margin, 2 Health & Hum. Rts. 60, 66–68 (1998).
29. Although Mandela eventually became an inf luential spokesperson on HIV, he first publicly addressed 
HIV and AIDS in 1997, three years into his presidency. See Interview by Renata Simone, PBS Frontline 
Producer, with Constitutional Court Justice Edwin Cameron (2009), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/biographies/nelson-mandelas-mixed-legacy-on-hivaids/.
30. For histories of AIDS neglect and AIDS denialism in South Africa, see Pieter Fourie & Melissa 
Meyer, The Politics of AIDS Denialism: South Africa’s Failure to Respond (2010); Nathan 
Geffen & Edwin Cameron, The Deadly Hand of Denial: Governance and Politically-Instigated AIDS 
Denialism in South Africa (Ctr. for Soc. Sci. Research, Working Paper No. 257, 2009).
31. See generally Brook K. Baker, The Impact of the International Monetary Fund’s Macroeconomic Policies on the 
AIDS Pandemic, 40 Int’l J. Health Servs. 347 (2010).
32. See Suzanne Daley, South Africa Scandal Over ‘Sarafina’ Spotlights Corruption in the A.N.C., N.Y. Times 
(Oct. 8, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/08/world/south-africa-scandal-over-saraf ina-
spotlights-corruption-in-the-anc.html. Sarafina II was a controversial and very expensive South African 
musical promoted as presenting an HIV prevention message.
33. See Pat Sidley, Miracle AIDS Cure Hits the South African Press, 314 Brit. Med. J. 450 (1997) (detailing 
the false claim of an HIV/AIDS cure that was in fact an industrial solvent).
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state response to the pandemic.34 However, from the earliest stages, TAC recognized 
that the prices of ARVs in South Africa would provide a ready excuse for governmental 
neglect, procrastination, and prevarication.
 After the Durban conference, TAC and its network of affiliated AIDS activists35 
gained momentum by focusing on the global and national determinants of access to 
medicines.36 Marshaling the language of human rights while mobilizing 
communities,37 TAC waged a “defiance campaign” to force Pfizer to make 
f luconazole more widely available to treat opportunistic infections.38 Zackie Achmat, 
TAC’s chair, f lew to Thailand, purchased generic equivalents, and f lew back to 
South Africa, defying South African authorities to prosecute him.39 As pressure 
mounted, Pfizer partially relented and on December 1, 2000, announced that it 
would make Dif lucan, Pfizer’s brand-name f luconazole, available free of cost in 
South Africa to the government and non-governmental organizations for the 
treatment of cryptococcal meningitis and esophageal candidiasis, opportunistic 
infections commonly affecting those with AIDS.40 Pfizer was widely criticized for 
limiting the donation program to South Africa and later announced the expansion to 
34. Treatment Action Campaign, supra note 5, at 3, 19–25.
35. During its entire history, TAC collaborated closely with the AIDS Law Project, now Section27. See 
AIDS Law Project of South Africa Honored, Hum. Rts. Watch (Sept. 11, 2003), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2003/09/11/aids-law-project-south-africa-honored. For a short history, see Mark Heywood, South 
Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign (TAC): An Example of a Successful Human Rights Campaign for Health, 
Treatment Action Campaign (Mar. 26, 2008, 4:19 PM), http://www.tac.org.za/community/
node/2064.
36. See Treatment Action Campaign, supra note 5; see also Mandisa Mbali, South African AIDS 
Activism and Global Health Politics 1–2 (2013); Eduard Grebe, The Treatment Action Campaign’s 
Struggle for AIDS Treatment in South Africa: Coalition-building Through Networks, 37 J. Southern Afr. 
Stud. 849 (2011) (discussing the TAC coalition-building strategy designed to create networks of 
inf luence); Mark Heywood, South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign: Combining Law and Social 
Mobilization to Realize the Right to Health, 1 J. Hum. Rts. Prac. 14 (2009). See generally Jonathan 
Michael Berger, Litigation Strategies to Gain Access to Treatment for HIV/AIDS: The Case of South Africa’s 
Treatment Action Campaign, 20 Wis. Int’l L.J. 596 (2003) (describing TAC’s early litigation strategies); 
William Forbath, Cultural Transformation, Deep Institutional Reform, and ESR Practice: South Africa’s 
Treatment Action Campaign, in Stones of Hope: How African Activists Reclaim Human Rights 
to Challenge Global Poverty (Lucie E. White & Jeremy Perelman eds., 2011) (describing TAC’s 
early growth).
37. See Leslie London, What is a Human Rights-based Approach to Health and Does it Matter?, 10 Health & 
Hum. Rts. J. 65, 67–68 (2013); see also Krista Johnson, Framing AIDS Mobilization and Human Rights 
in Post-apartheid South Africa, 4 Persp. on Pol. 663 (2006). 
38. After the joint TAC/MSF campaign for access to affordable f luconazole was launched, Pfizer had 
offered to supply Dif lucan for cryptococcal menigititis, but that promise had not been formalized. See 
Pat Sidley, AIDS Patients in South Africa to Get Free Drug, 320 Brit. Med. J. 1095 (2000).
39. Tony Karon, South African AIDS Activist Zackie Achmat, Time (Apr. 19, 2001), http://content.time.com/
time/nation/article/0,8599,106995,00.html.
40. Konji Sebati, Pfizer Diflucan Partnership Program, 361 Lancet 72 (2003).
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include all of the Southern African Development Community41 and fifty least 
developed countries (LDCs).42
 TAC also sought to intervene in a major drug-company lawsuit against the South 
African government over proposed amendments to allow wider access to cheaper 
generic medicines.43 The drug company plaintiffs complained that section 10 of the 
1997 Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, which added 
section 15C, was unconstitutional and violated the WTO Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) by authorizing parallel 
importation.44 TAC’s involvement significantly raised the global profile of the ill-
advised lawsuit, and the AIDS Law Project, which represented TAC in its amicus 
intervention, strongly challenged the drug companies’ assertions.45 TAC called for a 
Global Day of Action on March 5, 2001, leading to demonstrations worldwide.46 On 
April 19, 2001, the drug companies dropped their lawsuit.47
41. Id. The Southern African Development Community includes Angola, Botswana, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Member States, S. 
Afr. Dev. Community, http://www.sadc.int/member-states/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
42. Press Release, Pfizer Inc., Pfizer to Offer Dif lucan Antifungal Medicine at No Charge to HIV/AIDS 
Patients in 50 Least Developed Countries Around the World (June 6, 2001), http://www.prnewswire.
com/news-releases/pfizer-to-offer-dif lucan-antifungal-medicine-at-no-charge-to-hivaids-patients-in-
50-least-developed-countries-around-the-world-72062052.html.
43. See Debora Halbert, Moralized Discourses: South Africa’s Intellectual Property Fight for Access to AIDS 
Drugs, 1 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 257, 257, 276–77 (2002); Mark Heywood, Debunking ‘Conglomo-Talk’: A 
Case Study of the Amicus Curiae as an Instrument for Advocacy, Investigation, and Mobilisation, 5 Law 
Democracy & Dev. 133 (2001) (describing the TAC’s intervention strategy at length).
44. See Pharm. Mfrs.’ Ass’n of S. Afr. v. President of the Republic of S. Afr., case no. 4183/98, Notice of Motion in 
the High Court of South Africa (Feb. 18, 1998). With respect to section 15C, the plaintiffs argued that it 
(1) allowed a constitutionally impermissible delegation of powers to the executive branch, in that the 
Minister of Health was authorized to decide patent rights without regard to the South African Patents Act 
and in that the Minister could allow compulsory licenses and parallel importation without any limiting 
guidelines, thereby depriving IP owners of their property without full compensation in violation of section 
25 of the South African Constitution; and (2) violated Article 27 of TRIPS and did so in further violation 
of sections 44(4) and 231(2)–(3) of the South African Constitution. Id. The South African government 
defended on two grounds: (1) “it claimed that Section 15C was constitutional, because it did not grant the 
Minister of Health broad powers to abrogate patent rights,” and (2) it maintained that section 15C 
complied with TRIPS because parallel importation was lawful under TRIPS and because section 15C did 
not address compulsory licensing. William W. Fisher III & Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The South Africa 
AIDS Controversy: A Case Study in Patent Law and Policy 6 (2005). For an early discussion of 
the South African pharmaceutical case even before it was decided, see Duane Nash, South Africa’s Medicines 
and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 485 (2000). For analysis 
post withdrawal of the lawsuit, see Fisher & Rigamonti, supra.
45. See Heywood, supra note 43, at 142–43, 148–51.
46. See, e.g., John S. James, March 5: “Global Day of Action Against Drug Company Profiteering,” as Pharmaceutical 
Companies Sue South Africa to Block Low-Cost Medicines, Body (Jan. 26, 2001), http://www.thebody.com/
content/art32009.html; Anso Thom, Overwhelming Support From Around the Globe, Health-E News 
(Mar. 2, 2001), http://www.health-e.org.za/2001/03/02/overwhelming-support-from-around-the-globe.
47. Ann M. Simmons, Suit Against Cheap AIDS Drugs Ends in S. Africa, L.A. Times (Apr. 20, 2001), http://
articles.latimes.com/2001/apr/20/news/mm-53295; Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit 
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 These initial TAC campaigns were directed at the symptom, high prices, rather 
than the source, namely international and South African IP regimes. Even so, TAC 
turned its attention toward national health policy and pressed the government to 
implement a PMTCT program that provided a single dose of nevirapine to the 
mother and the newborn to reduce the risk of HIV transmission by nearly fifty per 
cent.48 Despite all available scientific evidence and an offer of free nevirapine from 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, the government refused to make nevirapine broadly 
available, provoking TAC, the Children’s Rights Centre, and others to lodge a 
Constitutional Court challenge.49 This now-famous case established a constitutional 
right-to-health rule requiring the government to engage in rational planning to 
address the interests of mothers and children in preventing vertical transmission of 
HIV.50 The Constitutional Court ordered the government to abandon its cautious 
pilot-study approach and instead to allow doctors working in the public sector to 
routinely administer voluntary ARV prophylaxis to reduce the risk of vertical 
transmission.51 In sum, the Constitutional Court ruled that the government had an 
obligation to plan and to act, thereby setting the stage for a more robust response to 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic and its intergenerational transmission.
 Not satisfied with a long-delayed victory on PMTCT, TAC turned its attention to 
the government’s failure to commit to an ARV treatment plan.52 In early 2003, TAC 
launched its “Dying for Treatment” civil disobedience campaign.53 In addition to 
organizing a demonstration of about 20,000 people on February 14, 2003,54 TAC 
formed a research committee of health economists and medical professionals that 
produced a draft National Treatment Plan demonstrating that initial costs of treatment 
scale-up would be offset in the future because of cost savings from averted orphanhood, 
Over AIDS Medicine, N.Y. Times (Apr. 20, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/20/world/drug-
makers-drop-south-africa-suit-over-aids-medicine.html. Unfortunately, it has taken years for the South 
African government to adopt implementing regulations on parallel importation and the regulations 
adopted are overly complex, bureaucratic, and burdensome. See General Regulations Made in Terms of the 
Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965, As Amended, GN R510 of GG 24727 (10 Apr. 2003).
48. See Treatment Action Campaign, supra note 5, at 19.
49. See Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). See generally Mark Heywood, 
Preventing Mother-to-Child Transmission in South Africa: Background, Strategies and Outcomes of the 
Treatment Action Campaign Case Against the Minister of Health, 19 SAJHR 278 (2003); Amy Kapczynski 
& Jonathan Berger, The Story of the TAC Case: The Potential and Limits of Socio-Economic Rights Litigation 
in South Africa, in Human Rights Advocacy Stories 43 (Deena R. Hurwitz et al. eds., 2009).
50. See Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 at para. 135.
51. Id. 
52. See Neil Overy, Int’l Budget P’Ship, In the Face of Crisis: The Treatment Action Campaign 
Fights Government Inertia with Budget Advocacy and Litigation 5 (2011), http://www.
internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/LP-case-study-TAC.pdf.
53. Dying for Treatment: TAC Briefing Document on the Civil Disobedience Campaign, Treatment Action 
Campaign (Mar. 10, 2003), http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/CivilDisobedience/briefingdocument.htm.
54. Ralph Berold, Review of 14 February March, Treatment Action Campaign (March 10, 2003), http://
www.tac.org.za/newsletter/2003/ns10_03_2003.html. 
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sick leave, and premature mortality.55 TAC enlisted the support of the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and HIV/AIDS clinicians and published a 
leaked report from the government’s Joint Treasury and Health Task Team that also 
demonstrated affordability and reduced mortality.56 Achmat, the TAC Chair and 
activist, famously promised not to begin AIDS treatment for his own worsening 
infection until other South Africans had access to medicine.57 In the face of public 
pressure, political risk from opposition parties, and global incredulity at its totally 
incoherent denialist stance, the South African Cabinet finally approved an ARV 
treatment plan on November 19, 2003.58 The impact of the government’s procrastination 
was measured in at least 333,000 lives lost and 35,000 babies born with HIV because 
of a failure to implement a reasonably feasible anti-retroviral treatment program and 
prevention of mother-to-child-transmission program between 2000 and 2005.59
 At the same time that TAC was advocating for a National Treatment Plan, it 
turned to competition authorities to force drug companies to lower the price of patent-
protected medicines. In 2002, Hazel Tau, a woman diagnosed with HIV, and others 
lodged a complaint before the Competition Commission against GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim (BI) for excessive private-sector pricing of their 
ARVs AZT, lamivudine, and nevirapine.60 This was a complicated case, requiring 
proof that the companies had dominant economic positions and that the ARVs in 
question were overpriced.61 TAC requested that the Competition Tribunal order 
compulsory licenses that would authorize generic manufacture and sale and a four to 
five per cent royalty.62 Experts retained by the Competition Commission broadened 
55. See Overy, supra note 52, at 5–6. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 7.
58. See Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and Treatment 
for South Africa (2003), http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/aidsoperationalplan1_0.pdf; see 
also Sarah Jane Marshall, South Africa Unveils National HIV/AIDS Treatment Programme, 82 Bulletin 
of the World Health Organization [WHO] 73 (2004). Despite this commitment, the treatment 
campaign did not meaningfully begin until 2006.
59. Pride Chigwedere et al., Estimating the Lost Benefits of Antiretroviral Drug Use in South Africa, 49 J. 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 410, 412 (2008).
60. See Treatment Action Campaign, The Competition Commission Complaint: Questions and 
Answers 1, 4 (2002); see also Belinda Beresford, The Price of Life: Hazel Tau and Others vs 
GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim: A Report on the Excessive Pricing 
Complaint to South Africa’s Competition Commission 35–37 (Jonathan Berger et al. eds., 
2003); CPTech’s 2003 Reports for the RSA Competition Commission, in Hazel Tau et al.v GSK, Boehringer, 
et al, Knowledge Ecology Int’l (Aug. 13, 2014), http://keionline.org/node/2074. 
61. Beresford, supra note 60, at 39.
62. The enforcement of competition law in South Africa is overseen by the Competition Commission, 
which investigates whether there is probable cause to believe that anti-competitive behavior has 
occurred, after which a referral might be made to the Competition Tribunal for administrative hearings 
and enforcement orders. See Who are We?, Competition Comm’n S. Afr., http://www.compcom.co.za/
who-are-we/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); see also Competition Tribunal S. Afr., http://www.comptrib.
co.za (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
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the competition theories to include the essential facilities doctrine, arguing that each 
medicine was independently necessary to formulate triple-dose ARVs.63
 On October 16, 2003, the Competition Commission found that GSK and BI 
had contravened the Competition Act by abusing their dominant positions.64 The 
companies were found to have denied competitors access to essential facilities and to 
have engaged in excessive pricing and other exclusionary acts.65 The Commission 
referred the matter to the Competition Tribunal for determination.66 Before the case 
reached the Tribunal, GSK and BI settled by agreeing to license their ARVs to 
generic companies for sales throughout sub-Saharan Africa.67 A competition strategy 
was used again in 2007 to seek broader access to efavirenz.68 TAC again lodged a 
complaint against a Merck subsidiary, Merck Sharp Dohme Ltd. (MSD), for its 
refusal to license efavirenz on reasonable terms.69 In response, MSD licensed four 
generic companies, two local and two foreign, to produce single- and fixed-dose 
efavirenz in South Africa and ten other southern African countries.70
 These cases have virtually ensured that drug companies will include South Africa 
and the whole of sub-Saharan Africa in their voluntary licenses or offer significant 
price discounts. As a consequence of this judicial and social activism, South Africa 
and the entire region have been included in the territorial limits of almost every 
license on anti-retroviral medicines granted to the Medicines Patent Pool.71 This 
inclusion is especially important for South Africa because almost all ARVs are 
patented there.72 Bigger markets also encourage more generic companies to enter and 
to engage in robust competition at efficient economies of scale, resulting in even 
more affordable prices.
 However, the relative ease of access with respect to first- and second-generation 
ARVs has not been extended to newer ARVs or to other classes of medicines, 
63. See Consumer Project on Tech., Report to the Competition Commission of the Republic of 
South Africa, Evaluation of the Essential Facilities and Exclusionary Acts 7, 108 
(submitted Sept. 9, 2003), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/Evaluation_Essential_Facilitites_
Exclusionary_Acts%20Final%20Report_Redacted_20030909.pdf.




67. See Settlement Agreements Secure Access to Affordable Life-Saving Antiretroviral Medicines, Treatment 
Action Campaign (Dec. 10, 2003), http://www.tac.org.za/newsletter/2003/ns10_12_2003.htm.
68. See Access to Generic Efavirenz in South Africa: MSD Agrees to Grant Licenses on Reasonable Terms, I-Base 
(Aug. 30, 2008), http://i-base.info/htb/560.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Licenses in the MPP, Medicines Pat. Pool, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/licensing/current-
licences/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
72. See Patent Status Database, Medicines Pat. Pool, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/patent-data/
patent-status-of-arvs/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
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including expensive cancer, diabetes, and cardiovascular medicines that are also 
desperately needed.73 The legal and structural fault that had not yet been addressed 
was a patent regime that made it extraordinarily easy in South Africa to obtain initial 
patents and secondary patents that perpetuate patent monopolies, thereby continuing 
to block generic access. It is to that regime that we now turn our attention.
iV. thE Origins Of ip MOnOpOLiEs and high priCEs74
 Colonialism imposed IP systems on subject countries that mimicked the home-
country system while prioritizing the interests of the colonial masters’ domestic 
industries.75 More recent neo-liberal economic theory has promoted longer, stronger, 
and broader IPRs, including those of pharmaceutical producers, as the engine to 
innovation, direct foreign investment, and economic and technological development 
in low- and middle-income countries.76 Under the siren song of this false ideology, 
heightened global and domestic IP protections allegedly promote research and 
development of medicines for indigenous diseases and further promote the 
development and registration of medicines for disease prominent in both the global 
south and the global north.77
 Even though this theory of IP’s catalytic effect has little or no evidence to support 
it, the U.S. and European governments have consistently pursued the commercial 
interests of their hugely profitable pharmaceutical industries at the expense of access 
to more affordable medicines in developing countries. One of the prime examples of 
this warped sense of priorities is the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)78 forced on 
developing country negotiators during the Uruguay round of General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations from 1986 to 1994. Despite TRIPS’s 
imposing globalized standards for patents, data protection, and enforcement, upper-
income countries have continued to pursue ever-higher IP standards through trade 
agreements and other bilateral pressure.79 Fortunately, TRIPS is not entirely one-
73. See Hans V. Hogerzeil et al., Promotion of Access to Essential Medicines for Non-communicable Diseases: 
Practical Implications of the UN Political Declaration, 381 Lancet 680, 684–85 (2013).
74. For a longer and more detailed discussion of the origins of intellectual property rights, see Baker & 
Avafia, The Evolution of IPRs, supra note 2, at 2–5.
75. In Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, the formal introduction of intellectual property laws began in the late 
nineteenth century, initiated by European colonial powers after the 1884 Congress of Berlin. See 
Carolyn Deere, The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics 
of Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries 35 (2009).
76. For a description and critique of this perspective, see Baker, Debunking IP-for-Development, supra note 
2, at 82–110.
77. Id. at 90–91.
78. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement].
79. See United Nations Dev. Programme & Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, The 
Potential Impact of Free Trade Agreements on Public Health 3–4 (2012); Peter Drahos, 
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sided. As detailed below, a number of f lexibilities were built into TRIPS that provide 
policy space for accessing more affordable medicines, and many of those f lexibilities 
were subsequently confirmed by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health (the “Doha Declaration”).80
 As stated, TRIPS introduced minimum global standards for protecting and 
enforcing nearly all forms of IPR, including patents, copyrights, and trademarks.81 
Under key provisions, member states must provide patent protection for a minimum 
of twenty years82 for any invention, including a pharmaceutical product or process 
that fulfills the criteria of novelty,83 inventive step,84 and industrial applicability.85 
Although preceding patent-rule pluralism in both the developed and undeveloped 
world had allowed discrimination between fields of invention, for example by 
excluding medicines,86 TRIPS expressly outlawed such discrimination.87 Similarly, it 
was no longer permissible to discriminate against imports in favor of locally produced 
products, thus allowing major pharmaceutical companies to control the place of 
production.88 Via TRIPS, pharmaceutical multinationals succeeded in consolidating 
their monopoly power internationally and now have the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing patented medicines or 
Expanding Intellectual Property’s Empire: The Role of FTAs, GRAIN (Nov. 30, 2003), https://www.grain.
org/article/entries/3614-expanding-intellectual-property-s-empire-the-role-of-ftas.
80. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/
DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
81. The pharmaceutical industry played a highly active role in a coalition of IP industries that persuaded 
United States and European trade negotiators to champion an enforceable international intellectual 
property regime. See Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns 
the Knowledge Economy? 61 (2003).
82. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 33.
83. Id. art. 27(1). Definitions and standards of novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability vary 
significantly between nations. Novelty generally requires that the alleged invention be new in the sense 
that it has not been anticipated in the prior art, all forms of written publication, oral disclosure, or 
public display anywhere in the world. See World Intellectual Prop. Org., WIPO Intellectual 
Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use 19 (2004), http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm/ 
[hereinafter WIPO Handbook].
84. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 27(1). Inventive step requires that the alleged invention not be 
obvious to persons skilled or highly skilled in the relevant art or arts and that it entails essential progress 
or advancement over the prior art. See WIPO Handbook, supra note 83, at 20.
85. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 27(1). Industrial applicability generally requires that the alleged 
invention have some non-theoretical practical use resulting in a tangible product or a process to produce 
a product. See WIPO Handbook, supra note 83, at 18.
86. When the Uruguay round of trade negotiations began in 1986, more than forty of the ninety GATT 
members did not grant patents for pharmaceutical products, while others granted process patents only. 
See World Health Org. [WHO], Network for Monitoring the Impact of Globalization and TRIPS on 
Access to Medicines, Meeting Report, at 15 (Feb. 19–21, 2001), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/
s2284e/s2284e.pdf.
87. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 27(1).
88. Id.
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medicines made with a patented process. In addition, TRIPS protected undisclosed 
information, including clinical test data that under some interpretations impede 
registration of generic drugs.89 For example, the United States interprets Article 
39(3) of TRIPS to require a period of data exclusivity, which prevents drug regulatory 
authorities from referencing or relying on originator’s confidential clinical data when 
assessing the therapeutic equivalence of a follow-on generic.90 Repeating such clinical 
trials would be costly and time-consuming and would also ordinarily violate human 
subject guidelines, meaning that data exclusivity acts as a de facto barrier to generic 
registration.91 Given rich countries’ comparative advantage in research and 
development, the developed world secured near-absolute competitive advantage over 
the developing world’s IPR-related industries via TRIPS.92
 Even after the passage of TRIPS, the United States continued a heavy-handed 
trade policy, threatening countries such as Thailand, South Africa, and Brazil with 
trade sanctions because they refused to grant TRIPS-plus rights to patent holders or 
because they proposed using TRIPS-compliant means to access more affordable 
medicines.93 As the HIV/AIDS pandemic intensified, and as treatment activists 
demanded a relaxation of the stranglehold patent holders had over life-saving 
medicines, developing countries collaborated to demand that public health be given a 
more meaningful role in the interpretation and implementation of the TRIPS 
Agreement.94 Thus, the Africa Group, in early 2001, requested that the WTO 
TRIPS Council meet to clarify TRIPS’s public health f lexibilities.95 On November 
14, 2001, WTO members unanimously approved the Doha Declaration, which 
89. See id. art. 39(3). For an extended discussion of options concerning appropriate use of undisclosed data, 
see Carlos María Correa, Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the Standards of the TRIPS Agreement (2002), http://apps.
who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/h3009ae/h3009ae.pdf.
90. See Karin Timmermans, Monopolizing Clinical Trial Data: Implications and Trends, 4 PLoS Med. 206, 
207 (2007).
91. See Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines, supra note 2, at 709–10.
92. See Table 5.13, World Development Indicators: Science and Technology, World Bank, http://wdi.worldbank.
org/table/5.13 (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
93. See Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from 
Seattle to Doha, 3 Chi. J. Int’l L. 27, 30–33 (2002) (detailing U.S.T.R. and pharmaceutical industry 
actions against South Africa and Brazil); Brook K. Baker, Myths and Realities: The Impact of the U.S.-
Thai FTA on Access to Medicines, CPTech (Jan. 25, 2006), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/
hgap01252006.html.
94. For a detailed account of this collaboration, see Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 469, 480–
90 (2002). Developing countries rejected the theory that differential pricing would meet their needs.
95. The Africa Group is the collection of all African countries that are in the relevant timeframe members of 
the World Trade Organization. With respect to the request of the Africa Group, see Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard 
from 2 to 5 April 2001, WTO Doc. IP/C/M/30, ¶¶ 229–33 (June 1, 2001); Submission to TRIPS 
Council Discussion on Access to Medicines, Developing Country Group’s Paper, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/296 
(June 19, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/paper_develop_w296_e.htm.
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emphasized the primacy of public health and the right of member nations to take 
measures to increase access to medicines for all.96
 Although the Doha Declaration confirmed member states’ freedom to issue 
compulsory licenses and rely on parallel imports as an alternative source for lower-
cost medicines,97 it left open sourcing issues for poor countries that could not produce 
medicines via domestic production because of insuff icient or ineff icient 
pharmaceutical capacity.98 Even if these “non-producing” countries issued TRIPS-
compliant compulsory licenses to importers and the exporting country also issued a 
compulsory license bypassing its domestic patent, the exporting company could only 
export non-predominant quantities pursuant to TRIPS Article 31(f).99 Since sub-
Saharan Africa has ten times as many HIV infections as India,100 this export 
restriction meant that India’s vibrant generic industry could never supply needed 
quantities in Africa. After twenty-one months of intense wrangling, WTO members 
finally resolved this problem with the Decision of 30 August 2003: Implementation 
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health (the “Paragraph 6 Decision”).101 The solution adopted is a procedural 
labyrinth,102 and its effectiveness is increasingly in doubt as it has been used only 
once in twelve years, to allow export from Canada to Rwanda.103
 While most upper-income WTO members had to comply with TRIPS by January 
1, 1996, developing countries were able to make use of transition periods until 2000,104 
96. Doha Declaration, supra note 80, ¶ 4.
97. See id. ¶ 5.
98. See id. ¶ 6.
99. Accordingly, if a medicine were patented in the exporting country and thus that country would need to 
issue a compulsory license, South Africa, with the highest number of people living with HIV and AIDS 
in the world, might not be able to import sufficient quantities to treat its population. This restriction 
could apply even to countries like India that did not previously patent medicines but would have to 
eventually do so with respect to medicines invented after 1994. See Baker, Processes and Issues for 
Improving Access to Medicines, supra note 2, at 15.
100. See UNAIDS, The Gap Report A18, A20 (2014), http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/en/media/
unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/2014/UNAIDS_Gap_report_en.pdf.
101. General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, WTO Doc. WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003).
102. See Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of 
Public Health, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 317 (2005); Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines, supra 
note 2.
103. Canada and Rwanda are the only two countries that have cooperated thus far to use the complex 30 
August 2003 Decision, and accounts of that effort suggest that further use of “Canada’s Access to 
Medicines Regime” is unlikely absent some key reforms. See Richard Elliot, Delivery Past Due: Global 
Precedent Set Under Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime, 13 HIV/AIDS Pol’y & L. Rev. 1, 6 (2008). The 
practicability and effectiveness of the mechanism is the subject of a continuing debate at the WTO 
Council for TRIPS. See generally Kaitlin Mara, Efficacy of TRIPS Public Health Amendment in Question 
at WTO, Intell. Prop. Watch (Jan. 3, 2010), http://www.ip-watch.org/2010/03/01/efficacy-of-trips-
public-health-amendment-in-question-at-wto/.
104. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 65(2).
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and countries that did not previously provide product patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals or other fields of technology had until January 1, 2005 to introduce 
such protection.105 In addition, least developed country (LDC) members were given a 
transition period until 2006.106 Via two agreed-upon extensions of that initial 
transition period, LDCs now have until July 2021 to become fully compliant,107 with 
the possibility of further extensions. Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration also 
extended the transition period for LDCs with respect to pharmaceutical products, 
data protections, and exclusive marketing rights until 2016.108 That period has since 
been extended until January 1, 2033.109
 Despite TRIPS’s public health flexibilities having become more firmly enshrined 
post-Doha, the United States and European Union continued their offensive to expand 
their own industries’ IP empires by shifting forums to bilateral and regional initiatives 
and using a ratchet strategy to always increase protections in subsequent agreements.110 
Such efforts focused on easing patent standards, lengthening patent terms, restricting 
adoption and use of f lexibilities, adding new drug registration-related barriers to 
generic access, and greatly expanding enforcement measures.111 In the African context, 
the U.S. Trade Representative sought such enhanced, TRIPS-plus IP rights and 
protections in trade negotiations with the Southern Africa Customs Union.112 At the 
105. See id. art. 65(4).
106. See id. art. 66(1).
107. Responding to Least Developed Countries’ Special Needs in Intellectual Property, World Trade Org., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ldc_e.htm (last updated Oct. 16, 2013).
108. Doha Declaration, supra note 80, ¶ 7; see also Council for TRIPS, Extension of the Transition Period 
Under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations 
with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. IP/C/25 (July 1, 2002); General Council, Least-
Developed Country Members—Obligations Under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with Respect to 
Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. WT/L/478 (July 12, 2002).
109. Council for TRIPS, Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for 
Least-Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WTO 
Doc. IP/C/73 (Nov. 6, 2015).
110. The intellectual property ratchet “means that each subsequent bilateral or multilateral agreement can and 
usually does establish a higher standard of IP protection.” Peter Drahos, The Global Ratchet for 
Intellectual Property Rights: Why It Fails as Policy and What Should Be Done About It 1–2 (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/pdrahos/reports/pdfs/2003globalipratchet.pdf.
111. See, e.g., Flynn et al., supra note 2, at 152, 177–78, 181 n.245; Dalindyebo Shabalala, Intellectual 
Property in European Union Economic Partnership Agreements with the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Countries: What Way Forward After the Cariforum EPA and the Interim EPAs? 10 (2008) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Oxfam_TechnicalBrief_5May08.pdf; see 
also Carlos M. Correa, Negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement European Union-India: 
Will India Accept TRIPS-Plus Protection? 10–12 (2009); Jean-Frédéric Morin, Tripping up 
TRIPS Debates IP and Health in Bilateral Agreements, 1 Int’l J. Intell. Prop. Mgmt. 37 (2006).
112. On November 5, 2002, U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick formally notified congressional 
leaders of the administration’s intent to initiate negotiations for a free trade agreement with the nations of 
the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU): Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland. To meet “standard[s] of protection similar to that found in U.S. law and that build on the 
foundations established” in TRIPS, SACU nations would have been required to limit compulsory 
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time, there was a strong argument that these efforts violated U.S. law113 and an even 
stronger argument that that they violated international human rights law.114
V. trips MiniMUMs, trips-pLUs, and trips pUbLiC hEaLth fLEXibiLitiEs
 Before detailing the Fix the Patent Laws Campaign, it will be useful to briefly 
summarize global initiatives for fundamental redrawing of IP norms and the more 
modest public health f lexibilities that South Africa is free to adopt within the TRIPS 
regime. Naturally, it is possible to argue that the one-size-fits-all TRIPS regime is 
ill-adapted to meet the developmental needs and human rights obligations of low- 
and middle-income countries. The Global Commission on HIV and the Law has 
gone so far as to demand a moratorium on enforcement of TRIPS with respect to 
pharmaceuticals, a cessation of trade pressure for low- and middle-income countries 
to adopt TRIPS-plus measures, and a United Nations review of the current 
monolithic, IP-centric legal regime with respect to medicines.115 Consultations have 
also been underway at the World Health Organization via its Global Strategy and 
licenses to national emergencies or to governmental, non-commercial use only, to bar parallel trade, to 
extend patent monopolies for administrative delays, and to link drug registration rights to patent status. 
Zoellick Letter to House and Senate Reveals USA Trade Designs on Africa, Afr. Faith & Justice Network 
(Nov. 4, 2002), http://www.mindfully.org/WTO/Africa-Zoellick-Trade4nov02.htm. Finally, these 
nations would have been required to enhance protections for clinical trial testing data and to adopt 
criminal enforcement for patent violations, including improvidently granted compulsory licenses. In sum, 
the proposed negotiation objectives would completely eviscerate the Doha f lexibilities, dramatically 
increase IP protection, and shamefully reduce access to more affordable generic products. See id.; Tenu 
Avafia, The Potential Impact of US-SACU FTA Negotiations on Public Health in Southern Africa (Trade Law 
Centre for Southern Africa, Working Paper No. 6/2004, 2004), www.cptech.org/ip/health/trade/sacu/
avafia112004.doc. Fortunately, the negotiations were suspended in 2006.
113. These intellectual property negotiation objectives also directly violate the principal negotiating 
objectives in the Trade Act of 2002, which requires the United States “to respect the Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted by the World Trade Organization at the Fourth 
Ministerial Conference at Doha, Qatar on November 14, 2001.” 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(C) (2002). 
Similarly, by seeking TRIPS-plus provisions found in U.S. law, the U.S. Trade Representative also 
directly violated Executive Order 13155, which in relevant part reads:
(a)  In administering sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States shall 
not seek, through negotiation or otherwise, the revocation or revision of any 
intellectual property law or policy of a beneficiary sub-Saharan African country, as 
determined by the President, that regulates HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical 
technologies if the law or policy of the country:
 (1)  promotes access to HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical technologies for 
affected populations in that country; and 
 (2)  provides adequate and effective intellectual property protection consistent with 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement) referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15)).
Exec. Order No. 13155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521 (May 10, 2000).
114. See Vawda & Baker, Achieving Social Justice in the Human Rights/Intellectual Property Debate, supra note 2.
115. See Glob. Comm’n on HIV and the Law, Risks, Rights & Health 86 (2012), http://www.
hivlawcommission.org/resources/report/FinalReport-Risks,Rights&Health-EN.pdf.
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Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation, and Intellectual Property, which 
recommends even more radical solutions for rectifying imbalances in the innovation 
and access ecology.116 Despite the potential merits of these more ambitious critiques 
of the IP system, pragmatic campaigners have focused on TRIPS f lexibilities to 
ensure that they are adopted and used.117




•	 	Strict standards of patentability, especially concerning 
combinations of prior art, novelty, inventive step, and 
industrial applicability
•	 	A requirement that variations of existing medicines 
demonstrate significantly enhanced therapeutic efficacy
•	 	No patents on new uses of existing medicines
•	 	No patents on combinations or admixtures of known medicines




•	 	No patents on surgical, diagnostic, and therapeutic methods—
can justify no new uses and methods of use patents
•	 	No patents on plants or animals, except sui generis system 
for plant varieties
•	 	No patents on genes or extractions from naturally occurring 
matter
•	 	No patents on abstract ideas, discoveries, theories of nature, 
computer software, or business methods
Art. 29
Disclosure
•	 	Applicant must disclose all known practical methods of 
carrying out the invention, and the best known mode
•	 	Patent holder must disclose status of corresponding 
applications and patents in other jurisdictions and the 
international non-proprietary names for medicines
116. See World Health Org. [WHO], Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property (2011), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/
s19648en/s19648en.pdf. For follow-up reports of the Consultative Expert Working Group on Research 
and Development: Financing and Coordination, see World Health Org. [WHO], Report by the 
Secretariat, WHO Doc. A/CEWG/3 (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.who.int/phi/cewg/en/; World 
Health Org. [WHO], Report of the Open-ended Meeting of Member States on the Follow-up of the 
Report of the Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and Development: Financing and 
Coordination, Geneva, 26–28 November 2012, WHO Doc. A/CEWG/4 (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.
who.int/phi/cewg/en/; World Health Org. [WHO], Report of the Regional Committee Discussions 
by the Director-General, WHO Doc. A/CEWG/2 (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.who.int/phi/cewg/en/.
117. See Brook K. Baker, Placing Access to Essential Medicines on the Human Rights Agenda, in The Power of 
Pills: Social, Ethical and Legal Issues in Drug Development, Marketing, and Pricing 239, 
244–45 (Jillian Clare Cohen et al. eds., 2006).
118. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 78.
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•	 	Pre- and post-grant opposition procedures allowed with 
broad standing rights and easy-to-use administrative 
procedures
•	 	Broad grounds for revoking patents, including inequitable 
conduct, fraud, non-payment of patent maintenance fees, 
failure to make required disclosures, and failure to satisfy 
requirements or standards of patentability
Patent term •	 	No provision requiring extensions for regulatory delays
Art. 30
Limited exceptions
•	 	Early working of pharmaceutical patents allowed both 
domestically and for export for the purpose of obtaining 
regulatory approval
•	 	Commercial and non-commercial research rights and 
educational use rights
•	 	Prior use and private, non-commercial use
•	 	Formulation at pharmacies for individual use
•	 	And other limited exceptions as needed, including 





•	 	Adoption of international exhaustion rule and easy parallel 
import procedures
•	 	Outlaw contractual limitations on export in support of 
parallel importation




•	 	Broad grounds for issuing compulsory licenses, including 
but not limited to excessive pricing, refusal to license 
or to permit use of an essential facility, failure to supply 
in sufficient quantities, failure to work, including 
local working, ensuring source of supply, and allowing 
combination products
     Reasonable time limits on required prior negotiations
     Easy-to-use administrative procedures
     Continued validity of license pending appeal
•	 	Licenses based on emergencies or matters of extreme 
urgency, public, non-commercial-use, and competition 
violations without prior negotiation
•	 	Competition-based licenses without restrictions on 
quantities exported
•	 	Production for export licenses either pursuant to the 
Paragraph 6 Decision or an Article 30 limited exception
•	 Judicial licenses allowed pursuant to Article 44.2
•	 Clear, easy-to-use remuneration guidelines established
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and access ecology.116 Despite the potential merits of these more ambitious critiques 
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ensure that they are adopted and used.117
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industrial applicability
•	 	A requirement that variations of existing medicines 
demonstrate significantly enhanced therapeutic efficacy
•	 	No patents on new uses of existing medicines
•	 	No patents on combinations or admixtures of known medicines




•	 	No patents on surgical, diagnostic, and therapeutic methods—
can justify no new uses and methods of use patents
•	 	No patents on plants or animals, except sui generis system 
for plant varieties
•	 	No patents on genes or extractions from naturally occurring 
matter
•	 	No patents on abstract ideas, discoveries, theories of nature, 
computer software, or business methods
Art. 29
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•	 	Applicant must disclose all known practical methods of 
carrying out the invention, and the best known mode
•	 	Patent holder must disclose status of corresponding 
applications and patents in other jurisdictions and the 
international non-proprietary names for medicines
116. See World Health Org. [WHO], Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property (2011), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/
s19648en/s19648en.pdf. For follow-up reports of the Consultative Expert Working Group on Research 
and Development: Financing and Coordination, see World Health Org. [WHO], Report by the 
Secretariat, WHO Doc. A/CEWG/3 (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.who.int/phi/cewg/en/; World 
Health Org. [WHO], Report of the Open-ended Meeting of Member States on the Follow-up of the 
Report of the Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and Development: Financing and 
Coordination, Geneva, 26–28 November 2012, WHO Doc. A/CEWG/4 (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.
who.int/phi/cewg/en/; World Health Org. [WHO], Report of the Regional Committee Discussions 
by the Director-General, WHO Doc. A/CEWG/2 (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.who.int/phi/cewg/en/.
117. See Brook K. Baker, Placing Access to Essential Medicines on the Human Rights Agenda, in The Power of 
Pills: Social, Ethical and Legal Issues in Drug Development, Marketing, and Pricing 239, 
244–45 (Jillian Clare Cohen et al. eds., 2006).
118. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 78.
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Arts. 8.2 and 40
Competition 
policies
•	 Prevent abuse of IP rights by right holders, licensing 
practices, or the resort to other practices that unreasonably 
restrain trade or adversely affect transfer of technology
Vi. sOUth afriCa’s pOrOUs patEnts aCt
 Having catalogued TRIPS f lexibilities, it is now time to examine the South 
African Patents Act 57 of 1978 as amended (the “Patents Act”)119 to discern whether 
it fulfills the government’s TRIPS obligation to take all available legislative measures 
to ensure access to medicines. Although the Patents Act has many defects in terms of 
maximizing TRIPS’s public health f lexibilities, the most obvious is its failure to 
require examination of patent applications, instead allowing a “depository” regime.120 
Under this regime, the Companies and Intellectual Property Registry Office 
(CIPRO) collects patent applications but does not examine novelty, inventive step, or 
industrial applicability.121 Instead, CIPRO only ascertains if the correct forms are 
filled out and payment has been made; thereafter, the application is approved without 
any substantive review whatsoever.122 Compounding this problem, patent application 
fees in South Africa are among the lowest in the world, twenty to thirty times 
cheaper than other patent regimes.123
 To say that South Africa has a problem in terms of its excessive granting of 
patents on medicines is an understatement.124 South Africa granted 2,442 patents on 
medicines in 2008 alone.125 South Africa grants about forty per cent more patents on 
medicines than even the European Union or the United States.126 In contrast, Brazil 
granted only 278 patents from 2003 to 2008, Columbia granted 439 from 2004 to 
119. Patents Act 57 of 1978.
120. See id. § 34 (“The registrar shall examine in the prescribed manner every application for a patent and 
every complete specification accompanying such application or lodged at the patent office in pursuance 
of such application and if it complies with the requirements of this Act, he shall accept it.”). Substantive 
examination is not prescribed by implementing regulations.
121. Anthipi Pouris & Anastassios Pouris, Patents and Economic Development in South Africa: Managing 
Intellectual Property Rights, 107 S. Afr. J. Sci., Nov./Dec. 2011, Art. # 355, at 5.
122. Id. at 111–12.
123. Id. at 6.
124. Id. (estimating that eighty per cent of South African patents would not have been granted were they 
actually examined); see also Catherine Tomlinson & Lotti Rutter, The Economic & Social Case for Patent 
Law Reform in South Africa (Treatment Action Campaign Research Paper, 2014), http://www.tac.org.
za/sites/default/f iles/The%20Economic%20and%20Social%20Case%20for%20Patent%20Law%20
Reform%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf.
125. Carlos Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing 7 (South 
Centre Research Paper No. 41, 2011), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s21395en/
s21395en.pdf.
126. Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven N. Sampat, South African Pharmaceutical Patenting: An Empirical 
Analysis, Treatment Action Campaign (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.tac.org.za/sites/default/files/
resources/Create%20Resources/files/Sampat%20presentation.pdf.
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2008, and Argentina granted 951 from 2000 to 2007.127 Likewise, India granted 
only 3,488 patents between 2005 and 2010.128
 Given its despository system, it is no surprise that South Africa has no patent 
opposition procedures. Making opposition procedures open to competitors and other 
interested parties could result in information and argumentation about prior art and 
standards of patentability leading to higher quality patents. Many countries, most 
notably India, have successfully adopted both pre- and post-grant opposition 
procedures.129 In contrast, competitors in South Africa are left to costly, time-
consuming, and economically impractical court invalidation procedures. Compounding 
the problem, South Africa has an untransparent patent registry that provides only 
limited information on patent applications, grants, and a filing’s current status.130
 Although South Africa has relatively high standards of novelty,131 except that 
new therapeutic or diagnostic methods shall be considered novel, its inventive step 
requirement is weak both on the books and as applied.132 As a result, patent holders 
can file recursive patent applications and thus evergreen their patent monopolies for 
minor changes in the form of the active pharmaceutical ingredient and in formulations 
and dosages.133 Extensive academic commentary suggests that such evergreening is a 
major problem.134 Also, the requirement that the invention be capable “of being used 
127. Correa, supra note 125, at 7.
128. Sushmi Dey, Drug Patents on the Rise: 3,488 in 5 Years, Bus. Standard (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.
business-standard.com/article/companies/drug-patents-on-the-rise-3-488-in-5-years-112092400024_1.
html.
129. See World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Eighteenth 
Session, Opposition Systems and Other Administrative Revocation and Invalidation Mechanisms, WIPO 
Doc. SCP/18/4 (April 3, 2012), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_18/scp_18_4.pdf.
130. See Pouris & Pouris, supra note 121, at 6.
131. See Patents Act 57 of 1978 § 25(5)–(9).
132. See id. § 25(10) (“Subject to the provisions of section 39(6), an invention shall be deemed to involve an 
inventive step if it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art, having regard to any matter which forms, 
immediately before the priority date of the invention, part of the state of the art by virtue only of 
subsection (6) (and disregarding subsections (7) and (8)).”). For a recent example of a weak application of 
the inventive step requirement, see Pharma Dynamics (Proprietary) Ltd. v. Bayer Pharma AG [2014] (4) 
All SA 302 (SCA) (holding that formulation with an enteric was sufficiently inventive to allow a 
secondary patent on rapidly soluble oral contraceptive).
133. See Tomlinson & Rutter, supra note 124, at 8–9.
134. The UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights recommended that developing countries exclude 
medical methods from patentability, “[a]void patenting of new uses of known products,” and “[a]pply 
strict standards of novelty, inventive step and industrial application or utility (consider higher standards 
than currently applied in developed countries).” Comm’n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, 
Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy 122 (2002); see also Tahir 
Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting of Branded Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of How 
Patents on Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended for Decades, 31 Health Aff. 2286 (2012); C. Scott 
Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 
31 J. Health Econ. 327 (2012); Carlos Correa, Tackling the Proliferation of Patents: How to Avoid Undue 
Limitations to Competition and the Public Domain (South Centre Research Paper No. 52, 2014), http://
www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/RP52_Tackling-the-Proliferation-of-Patents-rev_
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require examination of patent applications, instead allowing a “depository” regime.120 
Under this regime, the Companies and Intellectual Property Registry Office 
(CIPRO) collects patent applications but does not examine novelty, inventive step, or 
industrial applicability.121 Instead, CIPRO only ascertains if the correct forms are 
filled out and payment has been made; thereafter, the application is approved without 
any substantive review whatsoever.122 Compounding this problem, patent application 
fees in South Africa are among the lowest in the world, twenty to thirty times 
cheaper than other patent regimes.123
 To say that South Africa has a problem in terms of its excessive granting of 
patents on medicines is an understatement.124 South Africa granted 2,442 patents on 
medicines in 2008 alone.125 South Africa grants about forty per cent more patents on 
medicines than even the European Union or the United States.126 In contrast, Brazil 
granted only 278 patents from 2003 to 2008, Columbia granted 439 from 2004 to 
119. Patents Act 57 of 1978.
120. See id. § 34 (“The registrar shall examine in the prescribed manner every application for a patent and 
every complete specification accompanying such application or lodged at the patent office in pursuance 
of such application and if it complies with the requirements of this Act, he shall accept it.”). Substantive 
examination is not prescribed by implementing regulations.
121. Anthipi Pouris & Anastassios Pouris, Patents and Economic Development in South Africa: Managing 
Intellectual Property Rights, 107 S. Afr. J. Sci., Nov./Dec. 2011, Art. # 355, at 5.
122. Id. at 111–12.
123. Id. at 6.
124. Id. (estimating that eighty per cent of South African patents would not have been granted were they 
actually examined); see also Catherine Tomlinson & Lotti Rutter, The Economic & Social Case for Patent 
Law Reform in South Africa (Treatment Action Campaign Research Paper, 2014), http://www.tac.org.
za/sites/default/f iles/The%20Economic%20and%20Social%20Case%20for%20Patent%20Law%20
Reform%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf.
125. Carlos Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing 7 (South 
Centre Research Paper No. 41, 2011), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s21395en/
s21395en.pdf.
126. Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven N. Sampat, South African Pharmaceutical Patenting: An Empirical 
Analysis, Treatment Action Campaign (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.tac.org.za/sites/default/files/
resources/Create%20Resources/files/Sampat%20presentation.pdf.
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or applied in trade or industry or agriculture”135 is barely defined, except with respect 
to an exclusion for surgical, therapeutic, or diagnostic methods.136
 With respect to limited exceptions allowed by Article 30 of TRIPS, the Patent 
Act is also deficient. South Africa does not have a robust research and education 
exception that allows research with and on patented technologies for commercial, 
non-commercial, or educational purposes.137 This weakens university research and 
incremental research in general, particularly in the generic pharmaceutical industry 
that South Africa is trying to strengthen. Article 6 of TRIPS138 also expressly allows 
countries f lexibility to adopt an international exhaustion rule, permitting parallel 
importation of medicines lawfully placed on the market in other countries. 
Unfortunately, regulations implementing section 15C’s allowance of parallel 
importation139 are overly complex, rendering it essentially unusable.
 Similarly, compulsory and government use licenses, allowed under Article 31 of 
TRIPS, are incompletely operationalized in South African law. On the plus side, 
South Africa permits compulsory licenses for dependent patents that represent 
important technical advances of considerable economic significance.140 The Patents 
Act also allows compulsory licenses on the grounds of: (1) failure to work within a 
specified period of time,141 (2) failure to meet demand for the patented article to an 
adequate extent and on reasonable terms,142 (3) detrimental refusal to grant a license 
on reasonable terms,143 and (4) excessive prices for imported goods in relation to 
prices charged in countries where those goods are manufactured.144 However, these 
grounds are still incomplete in that the Patents Act does not have a general public 
health or public interest exception, a clear unreasonable price exception, a local-
EN.pdf; Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): 
An Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, PLoS ONE (Dec. 5, 2012), http://journals.
plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0049470#s1.
135. Patents Act 57 of 1978 § 25(1).
136. Id. § 25(11)–(12).
137. Evans Misati & Kiyoshi Adachi, U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. [UNCTD] & Int’l Ctr. 
for Trade and Sustainable Dev. [ICTSD], The Research and Experimentation Exceptions 
in Patent Law: Jurisdictional Variations and the WIPO Development Agenda, Policy 
Brief No. 7, at 7 (2010), http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/2011/12/the-research-and-
experimentation-exceptions-in-patent-law-jurisdictional-variations-and-the-wipo-development-
agenda.pdf.
138. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 6 (“For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, 
subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue 
of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”).
139. See Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965 § 7.
140. See Patents Act 57 of 1978 § 55; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 31(l)(i).
141. Patents Act 57 of 1978 § 56(2)(a).
142. Id. § 56(2)(c).
143. Id. § 56(2)(d).
144. Id. § 56(2)(e).
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working exception, a competition-based exception,145 or an exception grounded in 
the need to produce fixed-dose medicines combining products from multiple patent 
holders. In addition, the procedural requirements for issuing compulsory licenses are 
unduly burdensome and time-consuming and the Patents Act lacks remuneration 
guidelines. The result of these omissions is that no compulsory licenses on medicines 
have ever been issued in South Africa. Finally, despite provisions for acquisition of 
patents by the state and for “public purpose” use by a Minister of State,146 there are 
no specific provisions for public, non-commercial use licenses or for licenses in 
response to national emergencies or other matters of extreme urgency, though both 
might be covered by the public purpose language. Section 4 also unnecessarily 
requires negotiated agreement with the patent holder prior to issuing a compulsory 
license or a protracted formal court hearing with court appeal rights,147 neither of 
which is required by TRIPS Article 31.
 This is by no means an exhaustive list of defects in the Patents Act,148 but these 
deficits have been well known to Section27149 and to TAC and MSF activists. 
However, with the emergence of multi-drug resistent tuberculosis, hepatitis C, and 
other HIV co-infections, and with the exhorbitant prices often charged for medicines 
to treat these and other conditions, AIDS activists were becoming increasingly 
concerned post-2007 about the overarching structural defects in South Africa’s IP 
regime. They recognized that the high cost of medicines needed to treat other 
conditions, including the exploding burden of non-communicable diseases,150 meant 
that South Africa had fewer resources to expand its health workforce and strengthen 
its public sector health services. Activists knew that the DTI had begun deliberations 
on a new IP policy for South Africa in 2008. Accordingly, beginning in 2011, TAC 
once again turned its attention to the IP-determinants of unaffordable prices for 
145. There is an argument that the abuse of rights section at least partially covers violations of competition 
policy. See Jonathan Berger, Advancing Public Health by Other Means: Using Competition Policy, in 
Negotiating Health: Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines 181, 188 (Pedro Roffe 
et al. eds., 2005).
146. Patents Act 57 of 1978 § 4.
147. Id.
148. For example, the TRIPS Agreement allows for the use of competition policy to prevent abuse of IP 
rights under the Patents Act and to permit close regulations of the terms of IP licensing agreements. See 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 78, arts. 8(2), 40. In addition, the South Africa IP regime has some 
excessive provisions in its IP enforcement rules that might also be revised. See Frederick Abbott et 
al., United Nations Dev. Programme [UNDP], Using Competition Law to Promote Access 
to Health Technologies: A Guidebook for Low- and Middle-Income Countries (2014), 
http://www.undp-globalfund-capacitydevelopment.org/media/468621/undp-using_competition_law_
to_promote_access_to_medicine-05-14-2014.pdf.
149. Section27, the successor to the AIDS Law Project, has expanded its focus beyond HIV and AIDS and 
even health and is now focused more broadly on socioeconomic rights. See Section27, http://section27.
org.za (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
150. See Bongani M. Mayosi et al., The Burden of Non-Communicable Diseases in South Africa, 374 Lancet 
934 (2009).
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medicines and announced its interest in receiving intensive training on IP and access 
to medicines.151
Vii.  adVOCaCY-OriEntEd tEaChing and LEarning at thE intErsECtiOns Of 
hUMan rights, intELLECtUaL prOpErtY, and aCCEss tO MEdiCinEs152
 Historically, specialist training in IP “was offered by institutions operating within 
the UN system, such as the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), or 
patents offices in developed countries.”153 Such training has been criticized because 
developing country policymakers and patent examiners tended to adopt the biases and 
priorities of their pro-IP advisors and trainers.154 Similarly, in South Africa, IP has 
typically been taught from a pro-IP, pro-corporate perspective.155 A developmental, 
human rights-based approach, by contrast, would situate IP analysis in the developing 
country context, with specific attention to human rights, public health, and other 
public interest concerns. Some South African university courses in the late 2000s 
were beginning to adopt this perspective, most notably at the Masters level.156 
However, these courses were “generally aimed at post-graduate students or public 
sector employees.”157 Additionally, “[n]o course previously catered for the training, 
participation or perspectives of activists and advocacy specialists . . . .”158
 In an effort to increase activist participants’ knowledge about IP within a human 
rights framework, capacitate participants to engage in country and regional 
campaigns to overcome IP barriers, and promote access to medicines, Yousuf and I 
151. These observations emerged from series of conversations with MSF and TAC activists during the 
UKZN IP and Access to Medicines short course in 2011. For a discussion of the material covered in the 
course, see infra notes 154–65.
152. This section is largely drawn from Vawda & Baker, Achieving Social Justice in the Human Rights/
Intellectual Property Debate, supra note 2. 
153. Vawda & Baker, Achieving Social Justice in the Human Rights/Intellectual Property Debate, supra note 2, at 
77–78; see also John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation 83 (2000); 
Peter Drahos, “Trust Me”: Patent Offices in Developing Countries, 34 Am. J.L. & Med. 151 (2008); 
World Intell. Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/portal/en/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
154. See Carolyn Deere Birkbeck & Santiago Roca, An External Review of WIPO Technical 
Assistance in the Area of Cooperation for Development (2011), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_8/cdip_8_inf_1-annex1.pdf; Drahos, supra note 153, at 153. Recently, a more 
balanced approach to the training has been offered by the United Nations Development Programme in 
collaboration with international NGOs such as South Centre. United Nations Dev. Programme & 
South Centre, Intellectual Property Enforcement and Access to Essential Medicines (Regional Consultation, 
2011) (on file with author).
155. See Vawda & Baker, Achieving Social Justice in the Human Rights/Intellectual Property Debate, supra note 2, 
at 78.
156. The University of Pretoria’s Centre for Human Rights, for example, offers a one-week short course on 
“Human rights and Access to Medicines.” See Access to Medicines, U. Pretoria, http://www.chr.up.
ac.za/index.php/about-access-to-medicines.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
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developed an intensive two-week shortcourse159 that was supported by the Open 
Society Institute and delivered at UKZN.160 In addition to focusing on economic, 
legal, and regulatory issues affecting access to medicines, the course also devoted a 
full third of its curriculum to the development of strategic access-to-medicines 
campaigns by its participants. The objectives of the course were multifaceted and the 
subject matter diverse, but the fundamental pedagogy was one of collaboration and 
mutual learning oriented towards action. A variety of instructional methodologies 
was used, based primarily on exploring successful access-to-medicines campaigns 
and using a problem-solving pedagogy. There were formal presentations of complex 
material by the two co-instructors and other experts,161 in addition to small- and 
large-group discussions, breakaway sessions, and snap one-on-one discussions on 
critical or confusing points. Participants were also required to write reaction papers 
on assigned topics. In addition, instructors used media, roleplay, and debates to 
enhance understanding of key concepts.
 The main innovation of the course was to set aside three days for participants to 
work in country-based affinity groups to develop detailed strategic plans for 
actionable access-to-medicines campaigns. Participants conducted research and 
identified campaign goals, targets, strategies, and tactics. Midway through their 
strategy development, there were “grand rounds” where each planning team presented 
its emerging campaign for feedback and comment from other course participants. 
Finished campaigns were presented again on the last day of the course and received 
feedback and comment from the course instructors and other course participants.162 
As hoped, “[o]ne significant outcome generated by this course [was] the emergence 
of a pan-African solidarity among the participants.”163 In addition, “[t]he intensive 
159. Id. The course attempted, relatively unsuccessfully, to engage public officials. We did have two successes 
in this regard with the participation of an officer from the patent office in Zambia and a counsel to the 
Legislative Drafting Committee of the Ugandan Parliament. We also succeeded in attracting several 
academics from the Universities of KwaZulu-Natal and Zululand (South Africa), Makerere (Uganda), 
University of Malawi, and the National University of Lesotho.
160. Vawda & Baker, Achieving Social Justice in the Human Rights/Intellectual Property Debate, supra note 2, at 
78 n.118 (“[T]he UKZN School of Law . . . offered a short course on Intellectual Property and Access 
to Medicines, training . . . academics.”); see also Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines, U. KwaZulu-
Natal, http://ipatm.ukzn.ac.za/Homepage.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
161. We are especially grateful for the participation of experts such as Jonathan Berger, then from Section27; 
Andy Gray, Senior Lecturer and pharmaceutical expert from the Nelson R. Mandela School of Medicine, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal; Sean Flynn from the Washington College of Law, American University; 
Jerome Singh, lecturer from UKZN and ethical officer for Centre for the AIDS Programme of Research 
in South Africa; Anand Pillay from the South African Department of Health; Malebakeng Forere, 
Tabello Thabane, Ann Strode, and Devina Perumal from the UKZN faculty of law; Enga Kameni from 
the University of Pretoria; and various civil society experts including Catherine Tomlinson, TAC South 
Africa, and Paul Kasonkomona, Treatment Advocacy and Literacy Campaign Zambia.
162. Graduates of the UKZN course have also been involved in grassroots campaigns relating to stock-outs 
of medicines, demands for faster rollout of HIV treatment programs, the adoption of safer medicines, 
and earlier initiation of treatment.
163. Vawda & Baker, Achieving Social Justice in the Human Rights/Intellectual Property Debate, supra note 2, at 
80.
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interaction over two weeks yield[ed] a strong camaraderie, and participants 
develop[ed] a deeper understanding of their respective realities, challenges and 
prospects for change.”164 They continue to offer one another guidance and support in 
their work, usually on an informal basis.165 It was within this framework that the 
2011 participants in the course planned the Fix the Patent Laws Campaign.166
VIII. TAC, MSF, And SECTIOn27 LAUnCh ThE FIx ThE PATEnT LAwS CAMPAIgn
 On November 16, 2011, almost exactly ten years after the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, TAC and MSF formally launched the Fix 
the Patent Laws Campaign (the “Campaign”).167 In its first press release, TAC directly 
referenced the constitutional guarantee of the right to health.168 TAC’s November 
issue of its Equal Treatment magazine was devoted entirely to an explanation—in lay 
terms—of why the South African Patents Act had to be reformed for treatment access 
to occur.169 In January 2012, the Campaign issued a briefing document outlining 
needed reforms: (1) improved substantive standards and streamlined procedures for 
issuing compulsory licenses; (2) stricter standards for patentablity, excluding patents 
on new forms, uses, or formulations of existing medicines; and (3) adoption of a 
rigorous patent examination system with pre- and post-grant opposition.170 In 
February, TAC contacted the DTI about its delayed IP policy, delivering a letter 
requesting a meeting with Rob Davies, the Minister of Trade and Industry, to discuss 
the IP policy and Patents Act amendments that were needed.171
 Trying to persuade the media to take a more active role in reporting the urgency 
of patent law reform, TAC and MSF organized two media workshops on IP and 
access to medicines in late March 2012.172 To mobilize health activists, TAC and 
MSF organized a workshop at the July 2012 People’s Health Assembly173 and 
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. In 2012, course participants refined a similar plan concerning reform of the Industrial Property Act 
that was underway in Uganda.
167. See Press Release, Treatment Action Campaign, TAC Calls on Government to Amend South Africa’s 
Patents Act and Protect Our Right to Health (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=17. 
168. Id.
169. Fix the Laws—Save Our Lives!, Equal Treatment, Nov. 2011, at 1.
170. Fix the Patent Laws: Campaigning for Pro-Public Health Reform of South Africa’s Patents Act, Fix The Pat. 
Laws (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=79. 
171. Although the DTI had been promising release of its heretofore hidden IP policy for some time and had 
promised public consultations as well, the effort was marked by lethargy rather than alacrity. See South 
Africa’s Intellectual Property Policy: Process for Public Consultation?, Fix The Pat. Laws (Feb. 14, 2012), 
http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=116.
172. TAC/MSF Media Workshop on Intellectual Property and Access to Medicine, Fix The Pat. Laws (Mar. 2, 
2012), http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=136.
173. Invitation to Attend TAC and MSF Workshop During the Peoples Health Assembly, Fix The Pat. Laws 
(June 27, 2012), http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=338. Professor Vawda spoke at this workshop.
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organized a public lecture on patent law reform.174 TAC’s public messaging strategy 
included a brochure175 and a myth-buster paper.176 Responding to this pressure, the 
DTI’s Chief Director of Policy and Legislation announced that the Draft IP Policy 
would be submitted to the Cabinet on December 5, 2012.177 When the December 
date passed, TAC called on the DTI to submit its IP policy at the Cabinet’s January 
2013 sitting,178 and when that date was missed, another call for action was issued.179
 Their patience at an end, TAC activists picketed the African Intellectual Property 
Forum and delivered a memorandum to Minister Davies before his keynote 
address.180 Although the Minister predicted that the policy would be released shortly, 
once again it was delayed.181 Unsatisfied, TAC and MSF delivered yet another 
demand to the DTI in August.182 The DTI finally released its Draft IP Policy and 
invitation for public comment on September 4, 2013.183
 In response to the freshly released Draft IP Policy, TAC, MSF, and Section27 
expressed appreciation and promptly organized consultations in Johannesburg and 
Cape Town to discuss the policy with other members of civil society.184 Meanwhile, 
TAC members, MSF, and Section27 experts worked on a formal response. With the 
fruit of that labor in hand, protestors marched to the DTI in October 2013 and 
handed in a joint submission commenting on the Draft IP Policy.185 Shortly 
174. Invitation to a Public Lecture at UCT: Fix the Law, Save our Lives, Fix The Pat. Laws (June 6, 2012), 
http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=302.
175. Treatment Action Campaign & Médecins Sans Frontières, Fix the Patent Laws!, Campaign 
Brochure, http://fixthepatentlaws.org/brochure/Fix%20the%20patents%20web.pdf.
176. Myth-Buster, Fix the Pat. Laws, http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/
TAC_MythBuster_Patent_Reform.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
177. TAC and MSF Welcome Government’s Announcement that the Draft IP Policy Will Be Presented to Cabinet 
on 5 December 2012, Fix the Pat. Laws (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=459. 
Professor Vawda presented at this consultation as well.
178. TAC Calls on the Department of Trade and Industry to Submit the IP Policy to Cabinet at its Next Sitting in 
January 2013, Fix the Pat. Laws (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=523.
179. TAC Calls on the DTI to Set a New Date for Submission of the IP Policy to Cabinet, Fix the Pat. Laws 
(Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=526.
180. Activists Make Concerns Heard at African IP Forum—Minister Davies Responds, Fix the Pat. Laws (Feb. 
27, 2013), http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=540.
181. DTI Reneges on IP Policy Commitments, Fix the Pat. Laws (April 30, 2013), http://www.
fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=583.
182. TAC & MSF Memorandum to DTI to Urgently Fix the Patent Laws, Fix the Pat. Laws (Aug. 7, 2013), 
http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=630. 
183. Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property 2013 and Invitation for the Public to Comment, GN 918 
of GG 36816 (4 Sept. 2013).
184. Public Consultation on Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property—27th Sept, Fix the Pat. Laws 
(Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=673.
185. See South Africa: Stop Blindly Handing Out Patents!, Fix the Pat. Laws (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.
fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=777. See generally Médecins Sans Frontières, Treatment Action Campaign & 
SECTION27, Joint Submission on the Draft National Intellectual Property Policy, 2013 (Oct. 17, 
326
InternatIonal CollaboratIon on IP/aCCess to MedICInes NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 60 | 2015/16
thereafter, TAC and MSF prepared a more technical analysis of why South Africa 
could and should adopt a patent examination system.186 Although the central 
demands of the joint submission were similar to those articulated twenty-three 
months earlier, TAC and MSF had to balance continuing advocacy for needed 
reform with some positive acknowledgement of the commitments to a more pro-
access approach articulated in the somewhat confusing and poorly written Draft IP 
Policy. Knowing that the Draft IP Policy would face stiff opposition from IP 
industries, especially pharmaceuticals, the joint submission recognized South Africa’s 
commitment to consider adoption of a patent examination system.187 Nonetheless, 
the joint submission made a very concrete set of key recommendations.188
2013) [hereinafter MSF, TAC & Section27 Joint Submission], http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/10/S27-TAC-MSF-Submission_on_IP_Policy.pdf.
186. See Treatment Action Campaign, Médecins Sans Frontières & Research and Info. Sys. For 
Developing Countries, Briefing by TAC, MSF and RIS: Why South Africa Should Examine 
Pharmaceutical Patents (2012), http://www.tac.org.za/community/files/f ile/WhySAneedsan 
examinationsystem.pdf.
187. MSF, TAC & Section27 Joint Submission, supra note 185, ¶ 54.
188. Specifically, the recommendations include:
6.1. On patentability criteria:
 6.1.1.  The Patents Act should be amended to include stricter patentability 
criteria; and
 6.1.2.  In the context of medicines and other health-related products, new uses 
and methods of treatment should expressly be precluded from being 
granted patent protection; new forms of known substances should not be 
patentable to the extent that they fail to demonstrate the required degree 
of inventive step, strictly construed;
6.2. On patent searches:
 6.2.1.  CIPC online patent search database should be improved to facilitate 
access to accurate information on patents for ordinary users of the 
system. This would in turn help stakeholders, such as civil society take 
action to limit the granting of abusive medicines patents.
6.3. On substantive patent examination and opposition proceedings:
 6.3.1.  Recognising that the Patents Act already requires substantive patent 
examination, we call for the making of regulations dealing with the 
establishment and phased implementation of a substantive patent 
examination system; and
 6.3.2.  The Patents Act should provide for meaningful pre- and post-grant 
opposition mechanisms that recognise broad standing requirements 
inclusive of civil society and adequate access to information to facilitate 
such interventions;
6.4. On the relationship between medicines registration and patent protection:
 6.4.1.  Other than what is already contained in section 69A of the Patents Act, 
no linkage between medicine registration and patent protection should 
be recognised; and
 6.4.2.  Remedies for addressing delays in medicine registration processes should 
exclude patent extensions;
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 Yousuf and I continued to support the Campaign by reviewing campaign 
documents and writing blogs.189 Recognizing that it would be important to garner 
6.5. On compulsory licensing and parallel importation:
 6.5.1.  The current process in terms of section 56 of the Patents Act should be 
replaced by a simple, expeditious administrative procedure that is subject 
only to review proceedings in the High Court or the Court of the 
Commissioner of Patents. Government use licenses should not require 
any review proceedings in the High Court;
 6.5.2.  Pending any review of the grant of a compulsory license, interim relief 
should only be available—upon application—in exceptional 
circumstances and should not be available for the exercise of government 
use licenses;
 6.5.3.  Default positions regarding license conditions (including but not limited 
to royalty rates) and negotiation timelines should expressly be included 
in sections 4 and 56 of the Patents Act;
 6.5.4.  Licensing practices should expressly be regulated, as contemplated by 
Article 40 of TRIPS; and
 6.5.5.  Regulation 7 of the General Regulations made under the Medicines and 
Related Substances Act 101 of 1965 (“the Medicines Act”) should be 
amended to give full effect to section 15C(b) dealing with parallel 
importation;
6.6. On research and development (“R&D”), public funding, innovation and access:
 6.6.1.  The Department of Trade and Industry (“the dti”) should collaborate 
with relevant departments and statutory councils to ensure that publicly-
financed R&D in South Africa is aimed at delivering affordable 
inventions; and
 6.6.2.  In particular, the dti should engage with the Department of Science and 
Technology (“DST”) regarding the need to consider possible amendments 
to the Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and 
Development Act 51 of 2008 (“the IPRs from Publicly Financed R&D 
Act”);
6.7. On exceptions to patent infringement:
 6.7.1.  The Patents Act should exempt those aspects of scientific research that 
are not covered by section 69A; and
 6.7.2. The Patents Act should also include an educational use exception;
6.8. On data protection and exclusivity:
 6.8.1.  Calls for data exclusivity should be rejected on the basis that they are not 
required by Article 39.3 of TRIPS and they unreasonably and 
unjustifiably limit access to medicines; and
 6.8.2.  The status quo in this regard should be retained, with the Patents Act 
only making provision for data protection.
 Id. ¶ 6.
189. See, e.g., Open Letter: Promoting Access to Affordable Medicines in South Africa Through Patent Law Reform, 
Fix the Pat. Laws (June 15, 2015), http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=959; Over 130 International 
Organisations & Experts Demand Patent Law Reform in South Africa!, Fix the Pat. Laws (Oct. 17, 
2013), http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=773; Yousuf Vawda, The IP Debate—Let’s Not Be Fooled…, 
Fix the Pat. Laws (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=662. Yousuf also co-authored 
a book chapter assessing a pre-draft of the IP Policy. Andy Gray, Yousuf Vawda & Caron Jack, Health 
Policy and Legislation, in South African Health Review 2012/2013, at 3 (2013).
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expert analysis supporting the basic pro-public health thrust of the Draft IP Policy, we 
collaborated to obtain the signatures of over 140 organizations and global experts on an 
open letter to the DTI supporting the proposed patent law reform.190 In addition, 
along with other pro-access South African academics, we authored a submission to the 
DTI assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the Draft IP Policy,191 while authors of 
an inf luential United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)192 report again 
detailed the need for broad reform.193
 Although TAC and MSF had anticipated industry opposition to the Campaign 
and had discussed strategies for neutralizing that opposition as part of the UKZN 
course, even seasoned activists were surprised by leaks about the U.S.-based 
pharmaceutical industry’s well-funded but covert disinformation campaign against 
the proposed reform.194 Hundreds of thousands of dollars were spent setting up a 
campaign funded by U.S. companies but presented as if locally inspired and led.195 
Circulation of a leaked e-mail initiated a scandal, now called Pharmagate, and the 
activist and government response was prompt and harsh.196 Health Minister Aaron 
Motsoaledi described the plan as “genocide” and the conspiracy one of “satanic 
magnitude.”197 The issue received international attention at an Executive Board 
meeting of the World Health Organization.198 Besides immediately condemning the 
190. Over 130 International Organisations & Experts Demand Patent Law Reform in South Africa!, supra note 
189.
191. Tobias Schonwetter & Yousuf A. Vawda et al., Comments on Draft National Policy on Intellectual 
Property (IP) of South Africa, 2013 (Oct. 17, 2013), http://ip-unit.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/
IP-Policy-Academics-Submission_final171013.pdf.
192. See generally Intellectual Property, United Nations Dev. Programme, http://www.undp.org/content/
undp/en/home/ourwork/povertyreduction/focus_areas/focus_trade_and_investment/intellectual_
property/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (“UNDP helps strengthen developing countries’ capacity to 
sustainably procure affordable HIV and AIDS drugs within the rules and clauses of multilateral and 
other trade agreements.”).
193. See Chan Park, Achal Prabhala & Jonathan Berger, United Nations Dev. Programme, 
Using Law to Accelerate Treatment Access in South Africa: An Analysis of Patent, 
Competition and Medicines Law (2013), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/hivaids/
English/using_law_to_accelerate_treatment_access_in_south_africa_undp_2013.pdf.
194. On January 10, 2014, Michael Azrak, Merck’s Managing Director for South and East Africa, wrote an 
e-mail implicating two dozen companies and trade associations in a secret campaign to undermine patent 
law reform in South Africa. E-mail from Michael Azrak, Managing Dir., Merck & Co. (Jan. 10, 2014, 
12:18 PM), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/merck-email.pdf; see also Sarah Boseley, South African 
Pharma Firms Accused of Planning to Delay Patents Law Reform, The Guardian (Jan. 14, 2014), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/17/south-african-pharma-accused-delay-patents-law-reform.
195. See James Love, New Leaked Merck Missive Reveals Deep Drug, Medical Device Company Opposition to South 
African Patent Reforms, Knowledge Ecology Int’l (Jan. 20, 2014), http://keionline.org/node/1908.
196. See, e.g., Brook Baker, US PhRMA Bares Its Fangs—South Africa Patent Law Reform and Access to Medicine 
at Risk Yet Again, infojustice (Jan. 18, 2014), infojustice.org/archives/31986.
197. Phillip De Wet, Motsoaledi: Big Pharma’s ‘Satanic’ Plot is Genocide, Mail & Guardian (Jan. 17, 2014), 
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-01-16-motsoaledi-big-pharmas-satanic-plot-is-genocide.
198. See Statement of South Africa on Access to Essential Medicines (in the Wake of Pharmagate), Fix the Pat. 
Laws (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=847.
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pharma conspiracy in broad terms,199 TAC and MSF also released a paper debunking 
the pharmaceutical industry’s claims.200
 Sensing that the time was ripe post-Pharmagate and marching to the Department 
of Trade and Industry in Pretoria in March 2014, 1,000 health activists, led by TAC, 
MSF, and Section27, demanded finalization of the National Intellectual Property 
Policy before the general elections.201 Unfortunately, that finalization of the policy is 
still delayed. However, at a consultation in Pretoria on October 20, 2014, the DTI 
announced that it expected to finalize the IP Policy and to submit it to the Cabinet 
by the end of the year.202 The Department’s Deputy Director General of Consumer 
and Corporate Regulation expressed the DTI’s determination to adopt an 
examination system, to make patent-related data more transparent, to allow pre- and 
post-grant oppositions, to prevent evergreening, and to liberalize compulsory 
licensing.203 Regrettably, the long-awaited release of a final IP Policy will only be one 
step in an arduous reform process. The matter will eventually have to be taken up for 
Parliament to consider and pass implementing legislation. During this entire process, 
decisionmakers will face continuing pressure and lobbying from industry, and 
perhaps once again from the United States.204
iX. COnCLUsiOn
 The rebuff of pharmaceutical hegemony, and the promotion of generic 
competition within the framework of the right to health, is a case study of the impact 
that a coordinated social movement can have in challenging the basic legal 
architecture of monopoly power. Step by step, South African AIDS activists and 
their allies have focused far upstream at the underpinnings of exclusive rights, 
attacking structural and legal barriers to access to medicines, admittedly in a context 
still far too constrained by industry’s previous gains. Activists have used the rhetoric 
of human rights and South Africa’s constitutional guarantees to convince the 
government that it must effectuate its obligation to protect the right to health by 
reforming patent legislation that burdens the realization of that right. TAC, MSF, 
and other activists have also attempted to extend human rights practice by arguing 
that foreign powers, like the United States, must refrain from outside influence that 
thwarts access to medicines and have chastened the multinational pharmaceutical 
199. See TAC, SECTION27 and MSF React to PharmaGate, Fix the Pat. Laws (Jan. 18, 2014), http://www.
fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=823.
200. See Tomlinson & Rutter, supra note 124.
201. See MINISTER ROB DAVIES—OUR LIVES ARE IN YOUR HANDS!, Fix the Pat. Laws (March 
12, 2014), http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=873.
202. E-mail from Julia Hill, MSF, to the author (October 20, 2015) (on file with author).
203. Id.
204. See Phillip De Wet & Sarah Wild, New Drug Policy is Patently High Risk, Mail & Guardian (October 
31, 2014), http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-30-new-drug-policy-is-patently-high-risk; Peter Fabricius, 
SA Offers Chickens for AGOA Renewal, BusinessReport (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.iol.co.za/business/
news/sa-offers-chickens-for-agoa-renewal-1.1730442#.VEgu-yhy9UN.
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industry for its continuing, pernicious, and backdoor efforts to prioritize monopoly 
profits over people’s affordable access to essential public health goods. Over the 
course of a fifteen-year campaign, these activists have helped to increase the number 
of South Africans receiving anti-retroviral therapy to over three million today.205
 The Campaign has deployed diverse discourses—competition, public health, 
IP-moderation, and human rights—in pursuit of reform that will keep South Africa’s 
population healthy enough to overcome the legacies of apartheid. AIDS activists’ 
amalgamated right-to-access discourse, unlike some mainstream human rights 
discourses, is neither individualistic nor negative; it is instead a discourse of communal 
needs and equity whereby the rigid structures of pharmaceutical hegemony are at 
least partially dismantled.
 Advocacy efforts such as the Campaign, spawned and supported by the UKZN 
course, speak directly to issues of social justice. By further capacitating individuals 
and organizations to effectively analyze, understand, and engage with complex issues 
affecting the daily lives of people in South Africa, the course played a small but 
catalytic role in what might become a great achievement. The course sought to do so 
by leveraging the expertise and commitments of academics with the tenacious and 
hard-hitting activism of people living with HIV and AIDS and their allies. It sought 
to distribute knowledge and make it actionable in the service of global health justice. 
The most significant force for change, however, comes not from academics or even 
from the capacitated experts in TAC and MSF but rather from the broad social 
movement that TAC and others have helped to build and its network with AIDS 
activists worldwide. But an informed social movement is a stronger social movement. 
It has not only grounded experience of its human rights needs but also greater insight 
into the legal structures of oppressive corporate power, both national and 
international. Such a movement learns that even the most technical subjects can be 
translated into effective, humane calls for justice.
205. See South Africa Reflects on Battle to Curb HIV and AIDS, SouthAfrica.Info (June 10, 2015), http://
www.southafrica.info/about/health/aids-conference-100615.htm#.VZ_jBe1Viko.
